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Implementing Options Markets in California to Manage Water Supply Uncertainty 
 
Abstract 
In California, the tremendous spatial and temporal variation in precipitation suggests that 
flexible contractual arrangements, such as option contracts, would increase allocative 
efficiency of water over time and space.  Under such arrangements, a water agency pays 
an option premium for the right to purchase water at some point in the future, if water 
conditions turn out to be dry.  The premium represents the value of the flexibility gained 
by the buyer from postponing its decision whether to purchase water.  In California, the 
seller of existing option arrangements is often an agricultural producer who can fallow 
land, in the event that a water option is exercised. 
 
In this simulation-optimization approach, we seek to determine the value of transferring 
water uncertainty from one party to another at several locations in California, given 
current water prices and the spatial and temporal distribution of water year types in the 
state.  (Preliminary analysis covers northern California; future analysis will incorporate 
southern California.)  We analyze within a mathematical programming framework 
whether increased trading among water agencies across time as well as space would 
result in significant gains from trade.  We use output from CALVIN, an economic-
engineering optimization model of the California water system which runs the current 
configuration of the California water system over historical hydrological conditions, to 
generate water’s imputed price at different locations during different seasons.  We also 
explore reasons why previous theoretical calculations of option value in the western 
United States have far exceeded option premia on existing bilateral contracts. 
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 I. Introduction 
As water value increases, institutional mechanisms evolve to reflect increased 
scarcity of water. One such institutional mechanism is water markets, which have 
significantly improved the allocation of water. (See, for example, Hearne and Easter 
(1987) and Howitt (1994), who have calculated gains from trade associated with water 
market implementation in Chile and California, respectively.) In California, the 
tremendous spatial and temporal variation in precipitation suggests that flexible 
arrangements for trading water, such as option contracts, would even further increase 
allocative efficiency of water over time and space. Under such arrangements, a water 
agency pays an option premium for the right to purchase water at some point in the 
future, if water conditions turn out to be dry. The premium represents the value of the 
flexibility gained by the buyer from postponing its decision whether to purchase water. In 
California, the seller of existing option arrangements is often an agricultural producer 
who can fallow land, in the event that the water option is exercised. 
Although the variation in precipitation suggests that option agreements would 
benefit water users, water options trading in California has been limited. A well-
functioning options market in California would help make better use of existing storage, 
provide an alternative to additional storage construction, and reduce the supply-side risks 
inherent in the California water system. In this analysis we seek to determine the likely 
value of transferring water uncertainty from one party to another at several locations in 
California, using current water prices and the spatial and temporal distribution of water 
year types in the state. We prepare the ground for future research on calculating the   4
potential gains from trade associated with widespread adoption of option agreements, and 
explore reasons why water options have not been more fully utilized. 
This paper lays the groundwork for calculating water option value in California 
within a simulation-optimization framework.  We first describe existing option 
arrangements.  However, we describe a few of them, and offer them as a benchmark for 
comparing theoretical option value, once we have identified what the theoretical value of 
a water option is at various locations throughout the state.  One key piece of information 
required to determine option value is a distribution of the price of the underlying water 
resource.  Unfortunately, the history of water transfers in California is relatively short, 
and the prices we do observe for short-term transfers are often distorted by 
administratively set prices and long-term, multi-dimensional contractual arrangements. 
To circumvent this problem, we employ a simulation-optimization framework to 
construct a distribution of water prices reflecting the true economic value of water.  The 
model determines water prices by allocating water to agricultural and urban water 
agencies according to economic demand, across 72 years of historical hydrological flow 
data.  The resulting distribution will be used at a further data to estimate water option 
value at various locations in California.   
Background 
In the fall of 1994, the California Department of Water Resources implemented 
an options bank (Jercich, 1997).  Option contracts purchased from willing sellers through 
the bank allowed wholesale water purchasers to manage their supply risk in the event that 
1995 was as dry as the previous year had been.  Fourteen water agencies purchased 
options to buy water, which could be exercised any time before May 1995.  The options   5
were purchased for $3.50/acre-foot, with negotiated exercise prices between $36.50 and 
$41.50/acre-foot.  After the option contracts were signed, late season rainfall and snow-
pack changed the water year from dry to wet.  Consequently, no water agency that had 
bought an option exercised its purchase rights.  However, the willingness of water 
agencies to purchase options through the bank demonstrated that options can be a cost-
effective way for water agencies to prepare for potential drought.
1   
Since the 1994-95 options bank, water agencies in California have implemented 
several long-term bilateral option agreements.  Most notable among recent deals is the 
2003 sale of water by the Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water 
Authority, a contract which may endure for as long as 75 years.  Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California and Palo Verde Irrigation District have signed a 35-year, 
long-term option agreement, whereby Metropolitan may call from 25,000 to 111,000 
acre-feet each year.  To participate, Palo Verde receives a one-time fee of $3,170 for each 
acre participating in the program, and $600 for each acre that is fallowed under the 
program (MWD, 2006).  In preparation for this long-term arrangement, Metropolitan and 
Palo Verde entered into a two-year pilot program in 1992.  Under the pilot program, 
Metropolitan received the right to claim nearly 100,000 acre-feet.  Watters (1995) 
calculated the water price for the short-term pilot program to be approximately 
$140/acre-foot.  Under the terms of the pilot program agreement, Metropolitan could call 
the water in five or six years.  Using the Cox, Ross and Rubinstein method for 
approximating the Black-Scholes option pricing model, Watters determined the imputed 
                                                 
1 Howitt (1998) notes that the DWR options bank had low transaction costs, because any water transferred 
through the bank would have been based on measurable reductions in use rather than on permanent rights 
that would have been difficult to adjudicate.   6
call price of the water to by $15.70 for the six-year option and $9.40 for the 5-year 
option. 
Further, Metropolitan Water District serving Los Angeles has option agreements 
in place with 11 water districts in the Sacramento Valley, for 167,000 acre-feet.  The 
terms on the MWD option contracts are identical; MWD pays a premium of $10/acre-
foot.  The exercise price is $115/acre-foot in extremely dry years and $95/acre-foot 
otherwise.  There is also a $5/acre-foot surcharge for resolution of third party impact 
issues.  In 2003, MWD exercised its option to purchase 120,000 acre-feet (Quinn, 2004).  
In 2006, it did not.   
Thus, option agreements provide an additional mechanism for water agencies to 
manage the risk of water supply uncertainty.  They may also act as a substitute to the use 
of more expensive methods of meeting contractual obligations.  For example, the Bureau 
of Reclamation is exploring the use of forbearance agreements with its water contractors 
on the Lower Colorado River, as a relatively cost-effective way to meet its treaty 
obligations with Mexico in dry years (Kleinman, 2006). 
The benefits of implementing dry-year contingency markets have been calculated 
in other parts of the western United States. Hamilton, Whittlesey and Halverson (1989) 
determined that forming interruptible power markets, so that agricultural users in the 
Pacific Northwest could leave water in the river for hydroelectric generation during dry 
years, would increase the value of water nine times over. Clark and Abt (1993) also 
found through simulation that implementing water options in northern Colorado would be 
less expensive than water rights purchases and new infrastructure investment. Michelsen 
and Young (1993) came to the same conclusion, noting that option contracts on irrigation   7
water rights in Colorado are a relatively inexpensive form of drought insurance for urban 
water agencies. Our model addresses these aspects of option value and whether, given the 
state’s existing water system and hydrology, intra-year or inter-year options would 
generate greater gains from trade in California. 
Watters (1995) calculated the efficient option prices predicted by the binomial 
and Black-Scholes option pricing models for three bilateral contracts in southern 
California and determined that the contracts were sensibly priced. Her analysis suggests a 
role for wider use of options contracts to manage risk among water traders. As Watters 
only had access to historical prices of water transactions in California, she was unable to 
use her results to determine whether a much more active options market would benefit 
California, as we are able to do. More recently, Villinski (2003) used a finite-horizon, 
discrete-time, stochastic dynamic programming methodology for valuing multiple-
exercise option contracts in the Texas Lower Rio Grande. Our analysis will have the 
benefit of a longer data series (72 years of monthly simulated data rather than 18 months 
of actual data) and option price predictions across all sectors of the economy (rather than 
trades solely between irrigators). 
Model 
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) derive a binomial option pricing model which 
approximates the Black-Scholes option price model in the limit.  Watters (1995) follows 
their approach, using existing bilateral option agreements in California as the input into 
her model.  We also follow Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, though rather than relying on 
existing agreements, of which there are not many, we use the simulation-optimization   8
model described below to generate a distribution of water prices from which to calculate 
option prices.   
To price a call option for California water, we need the underlying water price, 
the variance of the rate of return on water, the exercise price of the option, the time to 
maturity of the option, and the risk-free interest rate.  The simulation-optimization model 
provides a vector of water prices from which to make a theoretical calculation of option 
value in future analysis. 
The generalized network flow optimization framework of CALVIN allocates 
water to agricultural and urban users so as to minimize economic losses, subject to flow 
and balance constraints on the network (Draper, et al., 2003).  CALVIN runs the current 
configuration of the California water system and estimation of current economic demand 
functions through 72 years of historical hydrological conditions.  CALVIN is the first 
engineering model of the California water system to utilize economic demand functions 
to allocate water among users. 
However, CALVIN makes storage, flow and use decisions with perfect foresight 
of the entire 72-year hydrological cycle.  Thus, the resulting storage patterns are only 
optimal in the presence of full knowledge of future water conditions.  Our model 
addresses this shortcoming by optimizing annual allocations of the current California 
water system on a monthly time step over historical hydrological conditions.  This model 
maximizes agricultural and urban surplus subject to water transport costs and a constraint 
on the carryover value of water from one year to the next.  The challenge is to infer from 
observed behavior for known water year conditions how allocation on the network will   9
occur over a variety of water years, when future water supply is uncertain.  We use self-
calibration.  The methodology, as described in Howitt (1998), is as follows.   
The model allocates flows over the network, using observed deliveries and 
inflows, to generate the economic values which underlie the observed decisions.  We use 
several years for this initial calibration stage, in order to capture behavior over a variety 
of water year types.  In this analysis, observed behavior is from a base run of the 
CALVIN model.  These values are used to generate a calibrated cost function, which is 
unconstrained yet still reflects the values which underlie the observed decisions.  This 
cost function, or forcing function, represents factors that affect behavior but that have not 
been specifically quantified in the underlying engineering model.  Such factors may 
include risk, cost and benefit function nonlinearities, and operating constraints. 
Finally, the model uses this unconstrained, calibrated cost function to run existing 
demands through a longer series of water years.  The resulting limited foresight model 
generates shadow values on the reservoirs which indicate water’s imputed value at 
different locations during different seasons in California.   
Thus far, the model extends from the three northernmost reservoirs in California 
(Lake Shasta, Whiskeytown Lake, Clair Engle Lake) to the floor of the Sacramento 
Valley.  In addition to the three surface water reservoirs, the model includes a 
groundwater reservoir, agricultural and urban demand.  The model currently uses 
hydrological conditions from 1922 to 1993.   
Results 
In this current configuration of the model, there are two network nodes across 
which the economic value of flows across the node is measured.  The first node, called   10
C3, is directly adjacent to the urban and agricultural demand centers of the region.  The 
second node, called C5, is the southernmost node in the current configuration of the 
model, connecting the current model with the remainder of the California water system.  
The marginal values on these flows indicate the economic value associated with one 
additional unit of water passing across these points.  At the first node, C3, there is no 
economic value associated with moving additional water across this node.  Given the 
functions of agricultural and urban demand currently utilized in the model, the marginal 
value of water is effectively zero.  At the second node, C5, there is considerable 
economic value associated with additional flows.  This result is unsurprising, given the 
strong demand for water downstream from C5, in the south of California.  
Conclusion/Discussion 
Simulated flows and deliveries from CALVIN, historical hydrological data, and 
data on current agricultural and urban demands allow us to indicate the value of water 
options with some accuracy.  While the existing simplified model makes clear the 
principle of calculating water value using these simulation methods, we are ultimately 
interested in using these methods to provide policymakers in California with an 
indication of the locational and seasonal value of water options.  Thus, in the future, we 
will expand our model of northern California to a full model of the California water 
system.  We will also compare these simulated results to theoretical calculations of option 
value.   
Third, in the future, we will also discuss why previous theoretical calculations of 
option value in the western United States have far exceeded option premia on existing 
bilateral contracts. Actual option value will be lower than the theoretical calculation in   11
the presence of other mechanisms for allocating water efficiently over time, such as 
storage, groundwater substitution, and spot and exchange contracts. However, avoidable 
transaction costs may also explain why past calculations of gains from trade associated 
with option markets have been significantly higher than option valuations negotiated in 
existing contracts.  
Finally, an interesting extension to the current analysis would be an exploration of 
the benefits to different water user groups of adopting options. For example, the 
Environmental Water Account allows state fishery managers to lease water in real-time 
for the protection of salmon runs and habitat, in response to changes in hydrological and 
environmental conditions. Water options might potentially provide these fishery 
managers with even greater flexibility?  
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